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AbstrAct
Crime in any society is inevitable. From its inception, the United States has dealt with 
crime in different manners. In the mid-20th century, federal and local governments 
turned their attention to stopping crime preemptively rather than reacting to it after 
the fact. This analysis looks at the history of policing in the United States, discusses 
the development of community policing based on Wilson and Kelling’s 1982 “Broken 
Windows” article. It also takes a sociological approach to analyzing the effectiveness 
of community policing in New York City as well as its relationship to: racial biases, 
police violence, police culture, and police reform. For the purposes of this analysis, the 
terms “broken windows policing,” “community policing,” “quality-of-life policing,” and 
“order-maintenance policing” are all meant to refer to the use of high frequency and 
discretionary policing to target public disorder and prevent the further spread of crime.
The United States was not the first country to implement community policing tactics. During the 19th century, Robert Peel conceptualized the London Met-ropolitan Police as a means of targeting civil agitators in urban London. This 
meant police could canvas communities and remove those they deemed nuisances and 
threats to public safety as a way of maintaining order. This urban tactic later took hold in 
large U.S. immigration hubs like New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, where Catholic 
migration threatened Protestants who believed immigrants were criminally inclined and 
racially inferior (Sekhon, 2019). This tactic served a similar purpose of using police to 
target those that were deemed threats to the public in order to preserve communities. 
Decades later, beginning in the 1960s, policing roles in the United States shifted from 
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order maintenance to stopping crime before it happened. This saw ex-criminals con-
ducting detective work, and an increase in police departments nationwide funneling 
resources into stopping crime proactively (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). 
Crime was not solely a concern of police. Beginning in the 1960s, crime became a 
hotbed topic of American politics. In 1971, President Richard Nixon announced a 
national War on Crime, saying, “Doubling the conviction rate in this country would 
do more to cure crime in America than quadrupling the funds for [Hubert] Hum-
phrey’s war on poverty.” This began the use of federal and state funding to put more 
police in communities, such as New Jersey’s Safe and Clean Neighborhood Program 
in the mid-1970s that funded foot patrolling, and Washington D.C.’s Policing Foun-
dation doing the same (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). In the next decade, President Ron-
ald Reagan expanded the U.S.’s crusade on crime, announcing the “War on Drugs” 
in 1982 (Cover, 2014, p. 1142). These “wars” sparked the use of aggressive policing 
tactics. Investigatory stops, deemed racially discriminatory prior to the 1980s by the 
Kerner Commission, regained popularity in the 1980s and 1990s. These practices 
regained legitimacy through studies such as Lawrence Sherman’s Kansas City Gun 
Experiment, which found stopping vehicles with the intent to search for firearms cor-
related to a reduction in gun-related crime (Epp et al., 2014, p. 27, 32). An additional 
development was the Supreme Court’s decisions in the 1970s and 80s striking down 
public disorder laws for their vagueness which, according to William Stuntz at the 
University of Virginia, led police back to patrolling in cars, increasing the volume of 
police interactions with citizens (Rosen, 2000, p. 24). Prior to “Broken Windows,” 
the U.S. approach to crime varied widely.
introducing “broken windows”
In 1982, The Atlantic Monthly published an article by James Q. Wilson and George 
Kelling titled “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety.” The ten-page 
article described the blight of inner-city disorder, proposing that preventing public 
disorder and cleaning up city streets would decrease the amount of crime. Wilson 
and Kelling base their theory on Philip Zambardo’s famous Palo Alto car experiment, 
which found the presence of a broken window on a car will lead others to break more 
windows. This led Wilson and Kelling (1982) to link disorder and crime, with the 
idea that disorder in cities breeds an environment for crime to occur. Under their 
theory, the presence of disorder leads to crime, which leads to a loss of order. Teens 
standing outside a storefront may be asked to leave and may refuse. The result is the 
potential for fights to break out, littering, and disorder both from a visual aspect and 
a communal aspect (Wilson & Kelling, 1982, p. 3). In their research in Newark, New 
Jersey, Wilson and Kelling (1982) found the public assigned a higher value to public 
order and felt safer when police were present to help maintain said order. What all of 
their research translated to was the proposal that police departments begin targeting 
minor infractions to avoid their prediction of a wider crime outbreak. Under “bro-
ken windows policing,” police can target  “suspicious persons or ‘vagrancy’ or ‘public 
drunkenness’—charges with scarcely any legal meaning,” inferring police are allowed 
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to use their discretion to determine what causes disorder (Wilson & Kelling, 1982, 
p. 6). In summation, a Broken Windows policy proposes that by allowing police to 
patrol streets using their discretion, they can prevent disorder that leads to an environ-
ment of lawlessness and crime.
A critique of “broken windows”
Before analyzing how Broken Windows policing has affected the U.S., it is important 
to look at the sociological issues within the work itself. While the association between 
disorder, crime, and a total loss of order seems to be a legitimate argument, a deeper 
look at Wilson and Kelling’s article finds highly problematic proposals and language. 
First, Wilson and Kelling write, “The process we call urban decay has occurred for 
centuries in every city” (1982, p. 4). By making this claim, Wilson and Kelling seem 
to naturalize the disorder and blight found in many major cities. This is to say they do 
not give historical or socioeconomical explanations, like racial discrimination or gen-
erational economic distributions, as to why problems like poverty, crime, and a lack 
of mobility are such frequent characteristics of urban environments, but rather are 
content with just attributing these characteristics to urban areas and leaving it without 
question. They create the same issue when they refer to the “Nature of community 
life” in the Bronx that allows for crime to occur (Wilson & Kelling, 1982, p. 3). Their 
language makes crime and disorder seem inherent and natural in these environments. 
Not only do they naturalize disorder, they outright use problematic and charged lan-
guage, such as referring to the urban environment as an “inhospitable and frightening 
jungle” (Wilson & Kelling 1982, p. 3). The usage of the term “jungle” evokes racially 
charged feelings towards minority individuals. Though they also claim that the lack 
of mobility among poor urban citizens is related to racial discrimination, they fail 
to discuss the role of aggressive policing in that discrimination (Wilson and Kelling, 
1982). In the same breath, Wilson and Kelling (1982) fail to make an argument for 
how race would not play a key role in how police conduct themselves.
Initial Scholarly Response to “Broken Windows”
Upon its publication, “Broken Windows” was praised by many scholars as “attractive 
and eminently plausible” (Matthews, 1992, p. 21). However, many others found Wil-
son and Kelling’s thesis problematic. Some argued that order-maintenance policing 
would allow police to avoid accountability for the objectives of policing that actually 
matter, specifically crime reduction (Matthews, 1992). Other arguments were made 
that police would not treat instances like gang violence and domestic disturbances 
as actual crime, but rather take extralegal means to disperse disruptions and make 
communities feel and appear safer (Matthews, 1992). Rather than focusing on crime 
reduction, police would be performing a satisfactory job to the public by cleaning 
up the appearance of society (Bain et al., 2014). In addition to the above critiques, 
other scholars made claims that sociological research found little correlation between 
“incivility” and increased crime rates, meaning advocacy of order-maintenance polic-
ing is unnecessary (Matthews 1992, p. 27; Williams, 2014, p. 10). However, none 
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of the initial scholarly responses found issues with the inherent racially charged and 
discriminatory aspects of Wilson and Kelling’s language and proposals.
tHe Adoption of broken windows into 
policy
After its publication, the media and the public praised “Broken Windows” as the “bi-
ble of policing” (Harcourt, 1998, p. 292). In 1994, New York City Mayor Rudy Gi-
uliani and Commissioner of the New York City Police Department William Bratton 
instituted “zero-tolerance” policing policies based on Wilson and Kelling’s “Broken 
Windows” article (Howell, 2016, p. 1059). “Zero-tolerance” policing was a part of 
Giuliani and Bratton’s “quality-of-life” initiative introduced to NYC in 1993, which 
sought to crack down on low-level offenses and misdemeanors like turnstile jumping, 
panhandling, and public drinking to lessen what was considered public disorder. Or-
der-maintenance policing was initially called the “Holy Grail of the 90s” (Harcourt, 
1998, p. 292). Bratton realized targeting low-level offenses was effective, finding 1 in 
7 turnstile jumpers had arrest warrants. Between 1990 and 1997, directly after the 
appointment of William Bratton, misdemeanor arrests in NYC increased by 80% 
(Rosen, 2000). Wanting to expand on Giuliani and Bratton’s initiatives, scholar Dave 
Kahan suggested a “new path of deterrence,” which expanded quality-of-life initiative 
to include curfews, loitering laws, reverse sting operations, and shaming penalties, 
with the continuation of order-maintenance policing (Harcourt, 1998, p. 295-296). 
Giuliani and Bratton’s quality-of-life policing initiative seemed to interpret Wilson 
and Kelling’s correlation between disorder and crime to mean the eradication of low-
level offenses would reduce the crime rate and better public welfare through increased 
police-community interactions and arrests.
The introduction of community policing (“order-maintenance”) to New York City 
was mostly achieved through a drastic increase in misdemeanor arrests. 133,446 
misdemeanor arrests were made in 1993, increasing to 205,277 by 1996 (Harcourt, 
1998). Nationwide, the number of departments implementing community policing 
rose from 24% in 1997 to 64% by 1999. Between 2002 and 2011, stop, question, 
and frisk (SQF) searches increased by 603% nationwide (Mummolo, 2018,). In NYC 
alone, the court system handled 675,000 misdemeanors. Compare this to NYC in 
1989, and there were an estimated 200,000 more nonfelony arrests made in 2014 
(Howell, 2016). Besides arrests for misdemeanor offenses, summonses are a high-vol-
ume enforcement procedure police have used in NYC. Between 2003 and 2013, an 
estimated half million summonses were issued annually, an average of 1,200 to 1,600 
a day. In 2013, the most frequent charges were those Giuliani and Bratton sought to 
target: public urination, park offenses, public intoxication, disorderly conduct, and 
bicycle infractions (Fagan & Ash, 2017). As Wilson, Kelling, Giuliani, and Bratton 
had intended, the utilization of community policing has led to a crackdown on low-
level offenses in an effort to mitigate a loss of order and prevent the spread of crime.
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tHe legAlity of broken windows policing
Broken Windows policing means the adoption of high frequency stops and arrests of 
low-level offenders. It also includes the use of investigatory and SQF stops for police 
to prevent crime and disorder before it occurs, meaning police must use their own 
discretion and judgement to determine what poses a threat to public order. For police 
departments and policymakers advocating community policing, multiple Supreme 
Court decisions afford opportunities to undertake such procedures. Graham v. Con-
nor in 1989 permitted the use of police force reasonably necessary given the circum-
stances of an arrest (Sekhon, 2019). In Whren v. United States in 1996, the Supreme 
Court ruled that investigatory stops did not violate an individual’s Fourth Amend-
ment protection from unreasonable search and seizures if the stop was related to any 
violation of the law, regardless of its severity. Two years later, police were given the 
right to perform pat-down searches during traffic stops via Knowles v. Iowa, and later 
given the pretextual usage of “reasonable suspicion” through the decision in United 
States v. Arvizu in 2003 (Epp et al., 2014, p. 34-35). 
While these legal developments benefited police departments nationwide, it can be 
argued they drastically impacted the effects of policing on the public. With the right 
of police to use pretextual stops and “reasonable suspicion,” very little reason needs 
to be given for individuals to be stopped and searched by officers. Appearance alone 
can lead police to stop people, which if one considers the volume of policing and the 
concentration of minorities in urban areas, poses an unfair and dangerous situation 
for people of color. A person of color in a majority white neighborhood to police may 
pose “reasonable suspicion,” meaning they would be unfairly targeted. Stereotype bias 
can play a role in police discretion, leading to discriminatory practices (Spencer et al., 
2016). The right to use force in a system where police-civilian interaction is increased 
inherently poses a threat to public safety if officers deem force necessary based on their 
discretion (a subject that will be touched upon in a later section).
crime rAtes in nyc And nAtionwide
According to the Uniform Crime Report, crime has been on the decline across the 
nation since 1993 (Sozer & Merlo, 2013). It should be noted, however, that statistics 
suggest this decline was occurring years prior to the implementation of community 
policing. Between 1985 and 2009, homicide decreased by 71%, rape decreased by 
82%, robbery decreased by 80%, aggravated assault decreased by 55%, burglary de-
creased by 87%, auto theft decreased by 88%, and larceny decreased by 63% (Lieber-
man & Dansky, 2016). Government statistics show that between 2008 and 2015, 
violent crime rates have fallen by 19%, while property crimes have fallen by 23% 
(Gramlich, 2016). Since 2000 in NYC, the only crimes that have increased are for-
gery and identity theft, rising from 1,702 to 2,337 in 2013, along with misdemeanors 
such as DUIs, endangerment, and public administration offenses like bail jumping 
(Lieberman & Dansky 2016). Through the rise in arrest rates, incarceration rates have 
soared. In 1980, the combined U.S. jail and prison population was at an estimated 
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500,000 people. In 2011, that population was at an estimated 2.2 million (Cover, 
2014, 1142).
Despite falling rates of crime nationally, 57% of individuals polled before the 2016 
presidential election believe crime rates have increased since 2008 (Gramlich, 2016). 
Based on this polling, it seems Wilson and Kelling’s original goal of strengthening the 
public’s feeling of safety has failed. If this is true, then negative impacts of community 
policing this analysis looks to discuss are worsened by the fact that the entire “Broken 
Windows” system is flawed.
tHe logisticAl issues of community policing
Besides the public not feeling safe, a plethora of other issues come with community 
policing. First, community policing relies on the use of police discretion. It is com-
monly held by the public that police are “crime-control professionals.” This is despite 
the fact that police themselves have very little control over rates of criminal miscon-
duct and the victimization of the public (Sekhon, 2019). For instance, between 2008 
and 2012, summons and arrests were not issued or made in 90% of SQF stops, and 
90% of these stops were of nonwhite civilians (Mummolo, 2018). It was also found 
that 82% of stop and frisk subjects in 2014 were innocent (Lieberman & Dansky, 
2016). In 2017, New York was ordered to pay $75 million in settlement claims after 
Stinson v. City of New York found 900,000 summonses issued between 2015 and 2017 
lacked legal justification (Fagan & Ash, 2017). Police can always be wrong. As briefly 
mentioned before, discretionary policing allows, and inherently expects, officers to 
use their personal biases to conduct stops under the guise that they are acting within 
the law (Epp et al., 2014). This is bound to lead to errors in judgement, and further-
more comes down to “biased officer, biased arrest.” In the same sentiment, “by prom-
ising more than it can deliver, [community policing] inevitably prompts charges of 
selective reinforcement and discrimination” (Rosen, 2000, p. 4). An emphasis should 
be placed on the subject of “selective reinforcement.” As Rosen puts it, “If Giuliani 
were serious about zero tolerance, he could arrest Wall Street brokers who smoke pot 
in Battery Park and use the search as an excuse to look for evidence of Securities and 
Exchange Commission violations in their briefcases” (2000, p. 4). The issue with 
community policing is that it is not equally spread and undisputedly biased towards 
those in lower-income areas and problematic environments.
Another issue is that of the differences in police departments across the United States. 
It has been found that in larger departments, officers are less respected and support-
ed by their communities, and conversely officers are less responsive to the needs of 
the communities (Sozer & Merlo, 2013). It has also been studied that negative po-
lice interactions affect political participation and enhance negative views of the state 
(Mummolo, 2018). A lack of civil engagement by those who are negatively affected 
by community policing means these groups will continuously be underrepresented 
and in turn, further marginalized, which would likely create a cycle of inequality. An 
additional issue between small and large police departments is the difference in atten-
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tion to public safety. For example, a study of 207 small departments found that 84% 
ranked property crimes as their top priority, the same as their larger counterparts, yet 
ranked violent offenses against individuals fifth on a list of seventeen crimes (Sozer 
& Merlo, 2013). This would suggest again that the original goal of public safety in 
“Broken Windows” and community policing is lost.
It should also be noted that the introduction of quality-of-life policing coincided with 
an increase in complaints of police brutality. In 1993, the NYC Civilian Complaint 
Review Board received 3,580 complaints of police misconduct. In 1996, the Board 
received 5,550 complaints, and then 4,816 in 1997. The use of force and police dis-
cretion breeds an environment in which civilians can be victimized, worsening police-
civilian relations and creating the opportunity for the previously mentioned cycle of 
inequality.
Police Themselves
Having touched on the logistical issues of community policing, it is important to 
look at the police as a force themselves before analyzing the bigger issues of policing. 
First, there is the personality of the police. Studies show policing creates authoritar-
ian personalities, while other studies show police behavior to be linked to aggression, 
conservative ideologies, and substance abuse (Epp et al., 2014). In positions of au-
thority and responsibility, these characteristics can clash with the public, creating a 
hostile environment. Another point should be made that assigning officers to an area 
proportionally is one matter, but how police choose to patrol said areas can be prob-
lematic when considering they use their personal discretions (Fagan & Ash, 2017). In 
the 2000s, police reported that failing to produce “Stop-and-Frisks” resulted in pun-
ishments from the department and hindered opportunities for vertical career growth 
(Mummolo, 2018, p. 4). This speaks to the incentivized culture of policing, which 
likely creates further bias in individual officers to make stops. Sociological studies refer 
to the common issue of the “thin blue line paradox.” This paradox states that while 
police guarantee law and order, they themselves cannot be forced to submit to said law 
and order (Sekhon, 2019). This is to say that by acting in a system where supervision 
is minimal, police can act independently and take extralegal steps to meet their goals.
On the issue of culture, it would be cavalier to not look at police training and the cul-
ture it breeds in analyzing the issues of community policing. First, socialization and 
on-the-job training can make misconduct a norm. After the beating death of Rodney 
King in 1992, the Christopher Commission was formed to investigate the Los Ange-
les Police Department. Their report found multiple areas in which misconduct was 
ingrained in LAPD culture. Officers often discouraged filing reports of misconduct, 
being uncooperative and extending time periods to do so. Training programs also em-
phasized the use of physical force rather than verbal communication (Rushin, 2016). 
This is clearly an issue in a system where face-to-face interactions are the focal point 
of policing. In the Bronx, New York, residents report that police often draw their 
firearms early in civilian interactions. Undercover officers often dress out of uniform, 
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making it hard for civilians to identify them (Harring, 2000). These training tactics 
are all problematic when taking into account selective reinforcement of the law, and 
observing who is victimized by these tactics, which will be touched upon in another 
section.
While race is an issue among those that are policed, race within the police is of equal 
importance. In Ferguson, Missouri, 50 of 53 officers are white in a city whose popu-
lation is two-thirds black. In Hartford, Connecticut, 66% of officers are white in a 
city where only 16% of the population is white (Weitzer, 2015). When looking at 
the racial aspect of policing, and the sociohistorical context of racial discrimination 
and oppression, the lack of diversity in police forces creates a power complex between 
white officers and minorities. Not only does it create a power struggle between white 
elites and less powerful minorities who are responsible for abiding by the law, but for 
police themselves it is hard to lose the image of “racist police” when the majority of 
those officers are policing are people of color.
The Cost of  Community Policing to Police and the Public
The first of the two major issues this analysis looks to discuss is the cost of community 
policing on the public and police and its socioeconomic repercussions. With the im-
plementation of community policing, there has been a rise in fines and fees on the in-
carcerated population. This puts low-income individuals, who comprise the majority 
of the incarcerated population, at an economic disadvantage moving forward (Fagan 
& Ash, 2017). Those who are not arrested, but issued summons, are just as monetarily 
burdened with the cost of legal fees (Fagan & Ash, 2017). In a policing system where 
low-income urban areas are a high target for policing, it is apparent how low-income 
individuals are caught in a disadvantaged role economically. Fagan and Ash explain 
this issue the clearest:
Poor defendants may be unable to pay for filing fees to determine their eli-
gibility for indigent defense. Exercising the right to obtain a lawyer at the 
state’s expense cannot constitutionally be conditioned on ability to pay. In 
arguing their case, poor defendants may be unable to pay fees to obtain 
documents such as medical, employment, or housing records. If these 
imposed processing fees—taxes, in effect—are skewed racially by selective 
enforcement targeting black or Latino persons—or neighborhoods with 
high concentrations of black and Latino residents—the Sixth Amend-
ment concerns multiply, raising both due process and equal protection 
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. (2017, p. 46)
Lieberman and Dansky expand on this issue, explaining that concentrated poverty is 
a continuing issue, especially in black and Latino neighborhoods. In New York City, 
the poverty rate in white neighborhoods is 10.4%, while the poverty rates in black 
and Latino neighborhoods are 17% and 24.4%, respectively (Lieberman & Dansky, 
2016). Considering NYC alone in 2014 generated $32 million from misdemeanor-
based offenses, mainly from impoverished, aggressively policed neighborhoods, there 
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is a clear presence of economic and racial inequality perpetuated by aggressive com-
munity policing (Howell, 2016). Criminologists have used the term “million-dollar 
blocks” to refer to neighborhoods in which the state spends millions to incarcerate 
most residents. After residents are released, without money and unemployed, they 
return to spaces considered to be the most impoverished areas of the poorest neigh-
borhoods, like East New York and Brownsville in NYC (Lieberman & Dansky, 2016). 
Looking at these observations, it is not hard to argue there is a correlation between 
aggressive community policing of impoverished neighborhoods and socioeconomic 
inequality among people of color.
A reason this aggressive policing may persist is the advantage civil asset forfeiture 
(CAF) affords state and federal governments. CAF has become more prevalent since 
the pronouncement of the War on Drugs in 1982. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
and Prevention and Control Act of 1970 allowed for the seizure of illegal drugs and 
any means of production during arrests. Profits from said crimes were later amended 
into the Act. Then, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 introduced Fed-
eral Equitable Sharing, which allowed police departments to keep seized assets. Later, 
Congress passed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA) in 2000, which 
established the need for “a preponderance of evidence that property is subject to for-
feiture,” and now most states have their own forfeiture laws based on CAFRA. Forty 
states place the burden of proof on citizens to prove their property was not part of 
criminal activity (O’Connell, 2017). According to O’Connell (2017), even when 
states control 100% of a criminal investigation, the federal government is entitled 
to 20% of assets seized. This potentially acts as incentive for states to continue com-
munity policing for its monetary value and discourages federal governments from 
reforming policing because they too benefit from asset forfeiture. The payoff of CAF 
is large, with an estimated 56% of assets seized being valued over $1,000 (O’Connell, 
2017). CAF, according to O’Connell (2017), disproportionately affects minorities 
and the poor. As sociological studies of communities have shown, large banking firms 
have historically refrained from opening branches in minority neighborhoods, leading 
minorities to carrying larger sums of cash on their person, and results in a greater loss 
of assets when stopped by police (Murphy, 2010). In 2014 alone, the federal govern-
ment seized $4.5 billion worth of assets from citizens, and in 2015, the government 
took more property from citizens than actual criminals did (O’Connell, 2017). With 
monetary incentive behind community policing and CAF procedures, one can un-
derstand why the socioeconomic marginalization of the poor and minorities persist.
tHe issue of rAce
The most critical issue regarding community policing is arguably race. The history 
and effects of policing and its relationship to race, specifically people of color, is ex-
pansive, and therefore requires multiple discussions to highlight.
There is a long history of racially charged criminal law enforcement in the United 
States. In the 18th century, white colonial militia oversaw enforcement of New York 
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slave laws. During the Civil War, violent draft riots occurred between white and black 
civilians, leading most police at the time to side with white rioters out of a fear of a 
“Negro invasion” after the Union won the war. Decades later, police oppression in 
Harlem, New York, led to riots in 1935, 1943, and 1964 (Fagan & Ash, 2017). In 
1969, after a series of race riots in 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson established 
the Kerner Commission, tasked with cracking down on aggressive policing and the 
“wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minor-
ity groups, particularly Negros, frequently complain” (Huq, 2017, p. 2413). While 
this section barely scratches the surface of police-race relations, it demonstrates the 
continuation of issues between race and policing throughout centuries of U.S. history.
Community Policing and Race
Current stop-and-frisk policing is a result of the increase in violent crime in the 1980s 
that at the time was deemed a result of “ghetto poverty.” Proponents of community 
policing at its inception made the claim that violent crime was being committed 
mainly by the black population, therefore policing would be focused on those com-
munities considered problematic (Huq, 2017). As Fagan and Ash describe, “First, 
as practiced in New York, police presence and activity in minority neighborhoods 
seemed to have more to do with race than simply with crime. After controlling for 
local crime rates, a neighborhood’s racial composition predicted the police response 
in terms of proactivity. In other words, proactivity was about more than crime; it was 
also about race” (2017, p. 34). Immediately, one should recognize that basing policing 
methods on the assumption of racial bias is highly discriminatory. Secondly, assuming 
that “poor” translates to a negative connotation of “ghetto” is also problematic in that 
“ghetto” infers that individuals in this area are of a lower status than the rest of the 
community. Between the 1970s and the 1990s, the number of black citizens arrested 
for violent crime decreased, yet the number of blacks incarcerated in the same time 
period drastically increased (Filimon, 2015). This is largely due to the fact community 
policing focuses on minority neighborhoods. At the peak of stop-and-frisk in New 
York City alone, black citizens had a 92% chance of being stopped in the period of a 
single year (Huq, 2017). This type of racially biased policing has affected many states. 
In Maryland between 1995 and 1996, data on suspected stops showed that while 
blacks comprised 70% of drivers searched, only 28.4% were discovered to be in pos-
session of narcotics, while 28.8% of white drivers were found to also be in possession. 
In New Jersey, data from 2000 indicated blacks and Latinos comprised 78% of driv-
ers stopped and searched, yet the hit-rates for blacks and Latinos were 13% and 5% 
respectively, while the hit-rate for whites was 25% (Murphy, 2010). So, while police 
have targeted minorities in most traffic stops, most of the crime lies elsewhere. This 
data exemplifies the unnecessary targeting of minorities in search and seizures.
Discriminatory policing and selective enforcement means that only certain demo-
graphics are being punished for the same crime. Frank Zimring of the UC Berkeley 
School of Law conducted a study between 2004 and 2008 of police stops in New 
York City in which he found that blacks and Latinos constituted 28% and 28.6% of 
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the city’s population yet made up 52% and 31% of misdemeanor marijuana arrests. 
Whites constituted 35% of the city’s population, but only accounted for 10% of 
the same arrests (Lieberman & Dansky, 2016). In regards to stop-and-frisk in gen-
eral, other data on NYC shows that while blacks constitute roughly 22,6% of the 
population, they make up 54.6% of those stopped, whereas whites constitute roughly 
32.8% of the population but only 12.2% of those stopped (Lieberman & Dansky, 
2016). Another study conducted by Judge Noah Dear in Brooklyn, New York, ana-
lyzed summonses for public drinking in 2012 in a one-month span. The study found 
85% of summonses were issued to blacks and Latinos, while only 4% were issued to 
whites, despite Brooklyn’s population being 36% white (Fagan & Ash, 2017). This 
data unveils a disturbing proposition about community policing. Despite making 
up a smaller percentage of the population in NYC and the U.S. in general, people of 
color are stopped by police far more than white civilians. 
This only enhances the discussion of the racially discriminatory practices of commu-
nity policing. What this means for people of color is that they are likely to be targeted, 
more likely to be arrested, and more likely to have to face the consequences that come 
during and post incarceration, like unemployment and poverty. This is despite evi-
dence that people of color are not more inclined to be involved in criminal activity. In 
fact, the data offered in this analysis suggests inclination for criminal behavior is equal 
if not lower for people of color when compared to whites (Lieberman & Dansky, 
2016). These data play into a study that showed 70% of blacks in NYC have issues 
trusting law enforcement and believe they are treated unequally, which actually has 
the reverse effect in keeping communities safe when law enforcement does not have 
the support of the public (Lieberman & Dansky, 2016).
Discriminatory practices in community policing are not limited to New York City 
and other large urban areas. Ferguson, Missouri, is two-thirds black. Blacks accounted 
for 57.3% of radar-based stops on state roads, and 73.1% of non-radar-based stops. 
However, there is no logical empirical evidence that suggests black and white driving 
habits could explain such a large disparity in police stops (Fagan & Ash, 2017). Na-
tionally, blacks and people of color have always been arrested more often for crimes 
that community policing looks for; drugs, vagrancy, vandalism, and disorderly con-
duct. The graph below provides evidence of this by compiling data on the arrest rates 
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Figure 1. Arrest Rates by Offense and Race (Stevenson & Mayer, 2018, p. 259)
In terms of why the statistics look the way they do, it can be argued that historically 
the crimes people of color are arrested more for are crimes with victims. Vandalism, 
theft, selling drugs, prostitution, and assault are all crimes we think of as being com-
mitted at someone else’s expense; therefore, they are more detrimental to the public. 
So if the goal of community policing is to clean up the public image, and we know 
that there is an association of inner-cities with poorer public images, and we also 
know that these areas are predominantly inhabited by people of color, it is inevitable 
that this selective disparity would result in such an outcome.
Other studies support Stevenson and Mayson’s findings. In cities across the U.S., 
46.4% of people arrested for vagrancy and 58.7% of those arrested for suspicion in 
1995 were black (Harcourt, 1998). Based on the assumption by community policing 
advocates that minorities and “ghetto poverty” are associated, there is a clear problem 
in community policing targeting minorities and low-income areas (Huq, 2017, p. 
2413-2414). Based on the proponents’ assumptions, fewer resources for minorities 
and the poor would mean less transportation and fewer cars. Low employment rates 
mean neighborhoods are likely to have more residents around daily. Therefore, those 
living in these areas may be more likely to be on the streets or outside their homes, 
becoming targets for the crime community policing focuses on, such as loitering and 
suspicion. Combine that with the use of stop-and-frisk, and it becomes apparent that 
community policing and police discretion is inescapable for many in these areas. This 
may lead to the associated issues already discussed, like cyclical unemployment and 
poverty.
12
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As data has shown, community policing targets minorities and the poor. This has 
had an alarming effect on incarceration rates in the United States. Studies found that 
black-white incarceration ratios increased from 3:1 around the inauguration of Rich-
ard Nixon to 8:1 around the year 2000 (Filimon, 2015). This increase coincides with 
Nixon’s declaration of the “War on Crime” and the attitudes towards crime that in-
spired “Broken Windows” and community policing. Data from the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics show that by 2002, out of two million men incarcerated in the U.S. serving 
more than a one-year sentence, 586,700 were black and 235,000 were Hispanic, dis-
proportionately making up much more of the population than the 436,800 that were 
white (Filimon, 2015). As of 2007, 1 in 11 black adult males, compared to 1 in 45 
white males, were in correctional facilities. In 2011, between 6.6% and 7.5% of black 
males between the ages of 25 and 39 were incarcerated, and among men between 
the ages of 18 and 19, black males were imprisoned more than nine times the rate of 
white males of the same age (Cover, 2014). What this all means is that minorities in 
the U.S. suffer the consequences of incarceration at a higher rate than whites. Former 
prisoners are denied Pell grants for education, denied access to public housing, cannot 
vote, and face struggles of unemployment. Community policing and the dispropor-
tionate targeting of minority neighborhoods by police undoubtedly contributes to 
perpetuating a cycle of inequality for those who may already be disadvantaged.
police violence, fAtAlities, And rAce
Community policing requires heightened interactions between police and the public. 
What this means is that there is a higher likelihood of innocent civilians becoming 
victims of aggressive policing procedures that can lead to death. This is a problem that 
has been seen across the United States for decades. Amadou Diallo generally fit the de-
scription of a black rape suspect in Bronx, New York. When he entered his home after 
seeing an unmarked tactical squad vehicle, police took his behavior as suspicious and 
entered his home. After being told to stand still, Diallo reached for his pocket to grab 
his wallet, prompting four officers to shoot at him forty-one times, hitting him nine-
teen times and killing him. All four officers were found not guilty of Diallo’s death 
(Harring, 2000). In response to Diallo’s death and the death of Patrick Dorismond, 
defenders of Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s zero-tolerance policy claimed that the shootings 
were inevitable side effects to aggressive policing needed to keep the community safe. 
Their arguments in effect came down to “stop us from shooting the occasional in-
nocent man, and criminals will rule the street once more” (Rosen, 2000, p. 24). The 
troubling inference that supporters of Giuliani’s zero-tolerance policy made was that 
aggressive policing was necessary to prevent crime, even at the cost of innocent lives.
Amadou Diallo is unfortunately only one of many victims of police violence that 
come from community policing. Between 1980 and 2005, it is estimated 9,500 peo-
ple were killed by police nationally (Marcus, 2016). In 1994, Anthony Baez died in 
a police chokehold after being stopped for throwing a football in the streets (Howell, 
2016). Patrick Dorismond was killed in 2000 by police after being approached by 
an undercover officer who was looking for Dorismond to sell him drugs as part of a 
13
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police sting (Fagan & Ash, 2017). Rosan Miller, 7-months pregnant at the time, and 
while not killed, was put in a chokehold by police for grilling on a public sidewalk 
outside her home (Hamilton & McCall, 2018). Eric Garner was killed from a police 
chokehold after selling loose cigarettes on the street in Staten Island, a misdemeanor 
offense in New York. The chokehold used was banned by the New York Police De-
partment in 1993 (Marcus, 2016). In August of 2014, Michael Brown was stopped 
by police in Ferguson, Missouri, for walking down the street. After a struggle through 
the police car window, Brown ran roughly 15 feet before being shot in the back 
and killed. It was later established police were instructed that 15 feet was a distance 
that could permit use of lethal force (Marcus, 2016). In February 2015, 57-year old 
Sureshbai Patel, an Indian immigrant who spoke little English, was partially paralyzed 
in a police altercation after being stopped on the street while visiting relatives in Ala-
bama (Onyemaobim, 2016). In April 2015, Baltimore police executed a stop and sei-
zure on Freddie Gray after Gray fled from police after making eye contact. Gray died 
from a severed spinal cord after police took him on a fatal ride in the back of a police 
van with his ankles shackled on his stomach without a seat belt. In July of 2015, Sam 
Dubose was shot in the head through his driver side window after he was stopped for 
a missing license plate tag. The officer reported that Dubose reached for the ignition 
and was going to run him over (Marcus, 2016). 
These incidents are not isolated. In Philadelphia, where the city’s population is less 
than 50% black, 80% of police shooting victims were black between the years of 
2007 and 2013. In Ferguson, the Department of Justice found that nearly 90% of the 
police’s use of excessive force were against black residents (Marcus, 2016). The most 
notable fact of all these police-related deaths are that they resulted from tactics used 
under community policing. Stopping someone from playing or walking in the street, 
preventing someone from grilling on a sidewalk, and going out of the way to look 
for drugs are all methods that require police to go out of their way to find disorder 
in order to prevent crime and a loss of order. Unfortunately, the increased likelihood 
of face-to-face interactions also means that police are more likely to see the need to 
use force. It also should be noted all the victims of these incidents were people of 
color. Since community policing targets areas highly concentrated with minorities, it 
is likely that minorities and people of color are more at risk than whites to be victim-
ized by excessive force.
The Cost of  Violence to Police
Aggressive community policing and police violence come at a high cost to police 
departments and state governments. The city of Baltimore paid over $6 million in 
restitution for police brutality between 2011 and 2015. In 2014, the city of Chicago 
paid $50 million in restitution to victims of police violence. In 2015, New York City 
settled with the family of Eric Garner for $5.9 million. Again in 2015, Baltimore set-
tled with the family of Freddie Gray for $6.4 million (Marcus, 2016). Not only do 
the negative impacts of community policing and police aggression come at the cost 
of innocent civilians, it also places a financial burden on state funds. With the same 
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money used to pay for restitution and settlements, states could be reforming police 
departments and improve the areas that they deem so blighted that they necessitate 
aggressive policing.
“Broken Windows” and Community Policing Today
After decades from the implementation of community policing and the publication 
of “Broken Windows,” some sentiments have changed in the eyes of scholars and the 
public on the effectiveness and necessity of community policing. First, George Kel-
ling, along with William Bratton and the police commissioners of the Boston and Los 
Angeles Police, still defend community policing and its usefulness in maintaining or-
der. Kelling and Bratton argue that the type of policing “Broken Windows” advocates 
for is not the same as stop-and-frisk. To them, stop-and-frisk is different in that it is 
based on reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, which they recognize as constitutional 
under the decision of Terry v. Ohio in 1968. They argue that “Broken Windows” is 
not tactically instructive, but rather a proposal of policies that would mitigate disor-
der and prevent crime. Kelling and Bratton also cite a poll conducted by Quinnipiac 
University pertaining to support for order-maintenance policing that found “African-
Americans supported it by 56 to 37 percent, whites by 61 to 33 percent, and Hispan-
ics by the largest margin of all—64 to 34 percent” (Kelling & Bratton, 2018).
Some scholars, however, have found flaws in “Broken Windows” and community 
policing. One scholar found the history of the authors to be highly problematic. 
James Q. Wilson was a student and colleague of conservative urban theorist Edward 
Banfield, whose work in the 1960s included statements that claimed African Ameri-
cans were immobile because of “Negro culture,” inferring Black families lived off of 
welfare, and claims that low-income individuals supported communal disorder to 
keep rents low. Additionally, Wilson was an early advocate for mandatory sentencing 
and increased imprisonment of “wicked” people (Thompson, 2015, pp. 44-45). He 
described “wicked” people as including
A teenager hanging out on a street corner late at night, especially one 
dressed in an eccentric manner, a Negro wearing a “conk rag” (a piece of 
cloth tied around the head to hold flat hair being “processed”—that is 
straightened), girls in short skirts and boys in long hair parked in a flashy 
car talking loudly to friends on the curb, or interracial couples—all of 
these are seen by many police officers as persons displaying unconven-
tional and improper behavior. (Thompson, 2015, p. 45)
To scholars, Wilson’s association with such racially charged academic work and his co-
authoring of “Broken Windows,” which has undertones of discriminatory language, 
is highly problematic, especially when “Broken Windows” became the basis for such 
a widespread police movement (Thompson, 2015, p. 45). Others find that “Broken 
Windows” disregards verified research that offers alternate explanations as to why 
issues like poverty correlate to crime. Poor individuals have fewer resources, such as 
living space, that offer areas to partake in activities that are otherwise seen as illicit 
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and disorderly when done in public, such as drinking and socializing (Thompson, 
2015). The sentiments of scholars on “Broken Windows” and community policing 
are shared by policymakers like New York Senator Jesse Hamilton and the National 
Crisis Director for the National Action Network Rev. Kevin McCall. They find these 
methods of policing exhaust resources. They cite that in a court report from 2015, a 
three-month observation period of minor crime cases in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and 
the Bronx found that 86% of defendants were released without charge (Hamilton 
& McCall, 2018). The realization that “Broken Windows” and community policing 
have these effects on society is important for the opportunities to reform policing for 
the betterment of communities.
opportunities for reform
The first potential step to reforming community policing is the diversification of 
police departments. In cities like Ferguson, the disparity between white police and 
largely minority populations is not without notice. Diversification has been suggested 
by both the Obama Administration and the 1967 Commission on Law Enforcement 
and the Administration of Justice. While little research has been conducted on what 
effects diversification has on policing, it is not implausible to think that diversifica-
tion would help to strengthen community relations and legitimize police departments 
nationwide (Weitzer, 2015).
Section 14141 of the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act states 
any “pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers…that deprives per-
sons of rights, privileges, or immunities” is prohibited under federal law. Violations of 
Section 14141 are investigated by the Special Litigation Section of the Justice Depart-
ment’s Civil Rights Division. The Department of Justice has conducted sixty-eight 
investigations of misconduct, including excessive use of force in Washington DC and 
Miami and discriminatory policing in New Jersey and Arizona. 53% (36 cases) have 
produced enough evidence to confirm cases of misconduct (Chanin, 2017). These 
numbers seem low, and that is because they are. The DOJ only has enough resources 
to investigate 0.02% of Section 14141 cases (Rushin, 2016). By expanding the re-
sources available for Section 14141 violations, the federal government could begin to 
expand investigations, and this has the potential to make clear patterns that lead to 
misconduct, which then could lead to reform.
Congress has yet to mandate the reporting of police conduct complaints to the state 
and federal government. The DCRA, FBI, and BJS databases on police violence are 
not public record but could be made so under command from the Attorney General. 
The FBI manages the Uniform Crime Report, and the federal government periodi-
cally collects data on police training and budgets for the Law Enforcement Manage-
ment and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS), but neither database provides much in-
sight on police misconduct (Rushin, 2016). Information transparency is yet another 
way that patterns of misconduct can be uncovered and reformed. By making records 
public, mandating reports of misconduct and abuse, and requiring agencies to collect 
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more complete data, policymakers and police departments could use this information 
to alter methods of policing, specifically community policing.
Finally, Congress can take action to monetarily incentivize police reform. Congress, 
under the Spending Clause of the US Constitution, can implement conditional fund-
ing under the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program from the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to withhold federal police 
funding to departments that do not meet criteria for implementing policing proce-
dures that cut-down on problematic tactics (Ristroph, 2011). By withholding funds, 
Congress could incentivize police departments to limit their high-frequency usage of 
SQF stops and other tactics that have led to racial inequality. Section 1983 of federal 
legislation on Civil Liability for Police Misconduct allows victims of police miscon-
duct to file civil suits for damages due to unconstitutional treatment or violations of 
federal law by local and state police. However, Congress has not allowed for a private 
right of action to grant citizens the ability to pursue legal action towards the DOJ’s 
pattern or practice legislation (Ristroph, 2011). Therefore, citizens cannot take action 
against the DOJ’s lack of investigations into alleged misconduct. As a “one size fits 
all” initiative may not address the needs and issues of every department, the amend-
ment of a COPS reform mandating certain procedures for each department can make 
funding conditional and help mitigate issues caused by community policing (Ris-
troph, 2011, p. 384). This would help departments of all sizes advance efforts to limit 
misconduct and behavior that also breeds unequal treatment of citizens. Title VI of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act links federal funding to nondiscrimination, therefore giving 
statutory legal backing to reforming community policing, which studies have shown 
have discriminatory effects (Ristroph, 2011, p. 393).
conclusion
Since the 1970s and the declaration of the “War on Crime,” local, state, and the fed-
eral government have instituted tough-on-crime measures to proactively stop disorder 
and prevent the spread of crime. Wilson and Kelling’s “Broken Windows,” one of the 
largest influences on the community policing movement, was hailed for its propos-
als of retaining law and order through targeting areas of disorder. However, through 
the use of stop-and-frisk searches, high-frequency police interactions with the public, 
and the targeting of “problematic” areas, notably low-income and majority minority 
areas, community policing has created a system of enforcement that revolves around 
selective reinforcement, flawed police bias, and racially-charged assumptions of crime. 
In breeding this system, community policing has contributed to the marginalization 
of people of color and minorities, along with the poor, and has perpetuated cycles of 
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